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Abstract 
Many countries have tax facilities for pension savings. These facilities are often associated with the 
application of the cash-flow treatment of pensions: pension contributions are tax-exempt, capital 
income of pension funds is tax-exempt, and pension benefits are taxed, but usually at a relatively low 
rate. This paper investigates the revenue effects of a cash-flow tax regime for pension savings by 
full present-value calculations. A comprehensive income tax system is used as a benchmark. 
We present an empirical analysis for the Netherlands as a typical example of a country with funded 
pensions. Our calculations show that current taxation of pensions implies a major tax revenue loss. 
For the year 2003 we estimate a ‘fiscal subsidy’ of 1.4 to 1.5 percent of GDP. 
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Introduction 
 
In many countries pensions are the subject of great interest. Various studies have reviewed the 
ability of the pension systems to survive in view of the increasing aging of the population (Wise, 
2005; Van Ewijk et al., 2006; Gruber & Wise, 1999).1 In this context, the financing of pensions is 
important. Funded (private) pension systems are generally found to be less vulnerable to 
demographic shocks than public pay-as-you-go systems. This is the reason underlying recent 
pension reforms in for example Sweden and Germany (Sinn, 2005). These countries try to partially 
switch to funded pensions. A number of other countries already have substantial funded pension 
programs, such as the Unites States, Japan, the United Kingdom, Denmark, and the Netherlands. 
In many countries pension funding is stimulated through a favorable tax treatment of pension 
savings. A wide variety of tax regimes for occupational private pension saving are in place around 
the world. Generally, pension saving is taxed at a relatively low rate, although the revenue loss 
due to tax facilities for pension savings and/or pension tax expenditures may differ across 
countries. A strong fiscal stimulus to build up pension capital will support funding. However, these 
tax facilities may become an expensive business for governments. This paper investigates the ex 
ante revenue effects of a cash-flow tax regime for pension savings by full present-value 
calculations. To that end, we use a specified form of a comprehensive income tax system as 
benchmark. We employ an empirical analysis for the Netherlands, as a typical example of a country 
with an extensive funded pension system. 
The paper is organized as follows. The next section presents an overview of the tax treatment of 
pensions in OECD countries. We then model the ex ante revenue implications of the various tax 
treatments of pension savings. We choose for a partial equilibrium approach, so behavioral effects 
of implementing the benchmark tax rule will not be taken into account in our analysis.2 For the 
empirical analysis we use Income Panel Data from Statistics Netherlands (2006) for the years 
1990-2003. We simulate the revenue effect associated with the Dutch tax rule on pension saving 
for the period 1990-2003, which includes a major tax reform. In the final section some conclusions 
are presented. 
 
 
Tax treatment of private pensions in OECD countries 
 
The fiscal stimulus of pension saving in several countries is associated with the application of the 
cash-flow treatment of pensions under the personal income tax: pension contributions are tax-
exempt, capital income of pension funds is tax-exempt, and pension benefits are taxed. This form 
can be described as EET, with E denoting an exemption or relief from tax and T denoting a point at 
which tax is payable. The tax treatment of pension saving can have other forms as well. 
Contributions can be exempted, while the withdrawals and the accrual return on accumulated funds 
are taxed (ETT). Under a comprehensive income tax system (TTE) all income is taxed when it is 
received, so saving is from taxed income, interest income from savings is taxed, but proceeds of 
savings do not suffer further tax.  
Yoo & de Serres (2004) have presented an overview of the practice of taxation of private pension 
plans in OECD countries; see Table 1.  
 
                                                 
1 See for a detailed description of pension systems in Europe the report of the European Commission (2006). 
2  An intertemporal computable general equilibrium model with overlapping generations could be used to take 
into account behavioral responses to changes in tax regimes. For example, a less favorable tax treatment of 
pension savings may affect its size and therefore future tax revenues. It may also affect labor supply. 
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Table 1 Tax treatment of private pensions in 2003 a 
 
 Contributions b Fund Pension payments c  
    
Australia d  T pT T/PE 
Austria d  T (PE) E T/PE 
Belgium d E (TC) E T/PE 
Canada  E  E  T  
Czech Republic d  (T (S) E T/PE 
Denmark  E  pT (15%)  T  
Finland  E  E  T  
France  E  E  T/PE  
Germany  E  E  T/PE  
Greece  E  E  T  
Hungary d, e  T E E 
Iceland  E  E  T  
Ireland  E  E  T/PE  
Italy  E  pT (12.5%)  T/PE  
Japan  E  E  T/PE  
Korea  E  E  T/PE  
Luxembourg d  E E T 
Mexico  E  E  T/PE  
Netherlands  E  E  T  
New Zealand d  T T E 
Norway  E  E  T  
Poland  E  E  T  
Portugal d  E (TC) E T/PE 
Slovak Republic  E  E  T (15%)  
Spain  E  E  T  
Sweden  E  pT (15%)  T  
Switzerland  E  E  T  
Turkey  E  E  E  
United Kingdom  E  E  T  
United States  E  E  T  
     
Note: E = exempt; T = taxed under personal income tax; TC = tax credit; PE = partial exemption or 
deduction from taxation; S = state subsidy; pT = partial taxation. 
 
a. Private pension refers to mandatory or voluntary funded privately managed pension schemes. 
b. Tax-deductible contributions are subject to a certain limit in most countries. 
c. This generally concerns the tax treatment in the case of annuities. Many countries allow pension 
benefits to be withdrawn in the form of lump sums, in which case a partial exemption is granted 
so as to preserve tax neutrality with annuities. 
d. The tax treatment of the employer’s contribution is different from that of the employee’s. 
e. Mandatory contributions are fully taxed, but voluntary contributions receive tax credits. 
 
Sources: Antolín et al. (2004, p. 29) and Yoo & de Serres (2004, p. 80) 
 
Twelve OECD countries (Canada, Finland, Greece, Iceland, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, 
Poland, Spain, Switzerland, United Kingdom and the United States) apply the EET- regime in which 
withdrawals are subject to the progressive income tax rates, although often at preferential rates. 
Another ten countries (Austria, Belgium, France, Germany, Ireland, Japan, Korea, Mexico, Portugal 
and the Slovak Republic) also apply an EET-regime, but in these countries withdrawals are taxed 
more leniently than in the first group (for example through partial tax free withdrawal) or 
contributions are granted a tax credit rather than a full deduction. In Italy, Denmark and Sweden, 
taxation on contributions is also deferred, but accrued income from fund investment is taxed, albeit 
at preferential rates (ETT). In Australia, Austria, Czech Republic and New Zealand contributions are 
taxed. New Zealand comes close to a pure comprehensive income tax regime (TTE), while Australia 
is characterized as a TTT regime, but contributions can be partially exempted and investments 
earnings and benefits are taxed at a preferential rate. 
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Revenue effects under different tax regimes  
 
In this section we try to give an indication of the ex ante revenue implications of different tax 
treatments of pension savings.3 It should be noted that theoretical literature does not point at an 
appropriate tax system for pension savings. We use a specified form of a comprehensive income 
tax system (see below) as a benchmark (cf. Booth & Cooper, 2002).4 The tax due will be defined 
when applying the benchmark rule and when using an alternative tax rule EET. The structural 
revenue effect can be calculated in terms of net present value for application of the EET-rule and of 
the benchmark rule. The difference between the tax yield when using the benchmark rule and 
when using the EET-rule is called the ‘fiscal subsidy’ associated with the EET-rule. The expenditure 
side of the pension scheme must also be incorporated into the analysis. In the model described 
below we define for the different tax regimes both the present value of future tax receipts and the 
present value of pension capital, which will be converted into expenditure streams.  
Next to this present-value approach, a cash-flow approach could be used. In the latter approach, 
revenue effects are measured as the net amount of revenues foregone on contributions and 
accrued investment income and the revenues collected on withdrawals in the same year 
(corresponding to contributions made in previous years). As Yoo & de Serres (2004, p. 81) argue, 
the present-value approach has the advantage that it is not influenced by the history of past 
contributions or by demographic changes. Because this method takes into account the 
intertemporal shift in tax revenues, it provides a more accurate picture of the budgetary costs of 
tax-favored pension schemes.  
It should be mentioned that our model focuses on revenue effects and does not include other 
economic effects or social efficiency considerations. One of the purposes of favorable tax treatment 
of pension plans in many countries is to avoid moral hazard of workers, who may otherwise be 
tempted to consume too much of their earnings during work life and free ride on the social safety 
net once they retire (OECD, 2001, p. 30).5 These advantages need to be weighed carefully against 
the fiscal revenue effects of different tax treatments of pension saving, but also against the risk of 
poor targeting, as the tax relief may benefit groups who are not affected by moral hazard and 
whose prospective pension income is well above the social safety net. This paper will not attempt 
to quantify such welfare effects. 
  
The model 
 
Tax rule TTE (benchmark) 
We compare the revenue of a cash flow tax treatment of pension savings with a specific 
comprehensive income tax, in which no relief is given for the investment, and the proceeds of the 
investment are taxed, but pension benefits are exempt from tax. Pension benefits are based on the 
pension capital Vt which is accumulated from time t=0 to t=N. In the benchmark case the pension 
saving investment before tax, Co, proceeds at rate r. During the accumulation period the annual 
return on the investment is taxed at rate τg. The accruing process of the value of the pension 
capital Vt  (after tax) can be written as: 
00 CV =  
))1(1()1( 0001 gg rCCrrCV ττ −⋅+⋅=⋅⋅−+⋅=  
))1(1(12 grVV τ−⋅+⋅=  (1) 
t
gt rCV ))1(1(0 τ−⋅+⋅=  
                                                 
3 The analysis is limited to income tax; corporation tax has not been taken into account. 
4 The United Kingdom’s Inland Revenue states TTE as an appropriate benchmark for the calculation of tax 
expenditures; see Booth & Cooper (2002, p. 84). 
5  See Butare (1998) on the roles of government and markets in the case of pensions, and on market failure to 
justify (tax) subsidies. 
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So, the net present value of pension accumulated under the benchmark tax rule amounts 
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where the discount rate is denoted by δ. 
 
In the benchmark case no tax relief is given for the pension investment C0 at time t=0; the pension 
saving investment Co is out of disposable income (i.e. after tax τc). We denote the tax revenue 
under the benchmark rule in net present values at t=0 as 
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It should be noted that we assume a fixed level of (net) pension saving investment irrespective of 
whether the TTE-rule or EET-rule would be applied. In other words, we calculate the net tax costs 
per unit of contribution. Behavioral effects of implementing another tax rule will not be taken into 
account. As a result, our model generates different levels of net pension capital and net pension 
benefits when the TTE-rule and the EET-rule will be applied.6 Alternatively, one could argue that a 
model with a fixed amount of net pension capital and net pension benefits is more appropriate. 
However, in such a model it is overlooked that an EET-tax code stimulates the build-up of pension 
capital, and is therefore likely to yield a higher level of pension benefits.  
 
Tax rule EET 
The favorable tax treatment of pension savings in several countries is associated with the 
application of the cash-flow treatment of pensions under the personal income tax. In this case no 
annual return tax is levied during the accumulation period (τg=0), so the pension capital accrues by 
rate r each period: Vt = (1+r)·Vt-1. Pension capital will generate the amount available for benefits 
at t=N. The net present value of pension capital build-up under the cash-flow treatment of 
pensions under the personal income tax can be written as:  
N
N
EET
rCV
)1(
)1(
00, δ+
+⋅=
 (4) 
 
We denote the tax revenue of the cash flow treatment of pensions under the personal income tax 
in net present values at t=0 as 
N
N
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  (5) 
where τb is the tax rate on pension benefits. 
 
Fiscal subsidy on pension savings 
The pension capital build-up consists of two components: the pension contribution payments and 
the capital growth. When the benchmark rule applies, each of these two components would be 
taxed at the time of the build-up. When the EET-rule is applied, the levy only takes place on the 
pension benefit payments. So, the fiscal subsidy on pension savings in net present values can be 
denoted as  
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6  Moreover, the estimation of the revenue effect is restricted to direct taxation. It does not take into account 
that indirect taxes partially can offset the effects of the system of direct taxation. Paying less direct taxes 
increases spending over the life cycle and therefore leads to higher revenues from indirect taxes. 
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This means that there can be several aspects to the tax advantage of using the EET-rule compared 
to the benchmark rule:  
(a) the difference between the marginal tax rates on contributions and withdrawals due to rate 
progression, and because pensioners may be taxed at preferential rates (τc and/or τg versus 
τb);  
(b) the effect of not collecting any annual return tax on pension capital during the build-up period, 
in combination with the later moment in time of the tax payment.  
 
These partial effects of the fiscal advantage of using tax rule EET can be disentangled as follows. In 
principle, there is no gain from deferral if δ = r and the capital tax τg is zero. We therefore 
distinguish the effects of the positive capital tax on the one hand (holding τc and τb equal) and the 
differential treatment of young and old people, if any, on the other hand (holding τg at zero).  
 
The partial effect of low senior tax rates, S(a), can be calculated as: 
N
N
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rCCaS
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)1()( 00 δττ +
+⋅⋅−⋅=  (7) 
The partial effect of deferral tax payment, S(b), is the combined effect of not collecting any annual 
return tax on pension capital, and the later moment in time of the tax payment. This partial effect, 
S(b), ignores rate progression, i.e. we calculate the fiscal subsidy for τg > 0. 
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The no-fiscal subsidy case 
A fiscal subsidy of the EET-scheme, if any, leads to a lower effective tax burden compared to a 
comprehensive income tax system (cf. OECD, 1994). Governments may conclude that fiscal support 
of pension savings has become an expensive business. Obviously, also under the EET-rule it is 
possible to raise tax rates to reduce the fiscal subsidy on pension savings.  
We calculate the level of the tax rate under the EET-rule that would generate exactly the same 
amount of tax revenue compared to the benchmark rule. We denote this equivalent tax revenue 
yielding rate on pension benefits as τb*. The fiscal subsidy would disappear for: 
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The level of the equivalent pension benefit tax rate depends on the level of the tax rates of the 
benchmark case, on the level of the annual investment return rate r, and on the pension capital 
build-up period N.7 Note that the equivalent pension benefit tax rate will generally be (significantly) 
higher than the tax rates in the benchmark case.  
 
 
A numerical application for the Netherlands 
 
Dutch pensions 
From the OECD countries, the Netherlands has the highest relative amount of assets in tax-favored 
retirement saving plans: total assets represent more than 110 percent of GDP (Antolín et al., 2004, 
p. 30). In addition, participation in (mandatory) private pension plans and the share of these plans 
in total retirement income are high. More than 90 percent of the employees have, on attaining the 
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age of 65, supplementary pension insurance in addition to the basic flat rate public pension for all 
residents (OAP). Therefore, it can be expected that the tax treatment of these supplementary 
pensions has a relatively high significance in terms of net fiscal revenues. We analyze the case of 
the Netherlands as a typical example of an EET-regime (Bovenberg, 2003). However, it is not a 
pure EET-regime, because withdrawals are taxed at a lower rate, because pension benefit 
recipients over 65 years of age do not pay any contributions to the basic public old age pension 
scheme. In addition, marginal income tax rates on withdrawals are often lower than marginal rates 
on contributions because of rate progression. 
 
Assumptions  
We will simulate the revenue effects of the Dutch tax treatment of pension savings. The basis of 
the simulation is the amount of Dutch pension contributions which were deducted in the year 2000 
(14.9 billion euros, or 3.7 percent of GDP). A number of assumptions have to be made.  
The pension contributions entered into in 2000 mature for an unknown number of years until they 
pay out as benefits. We estimated a weighted average duration of capital build-up of around 15 
years.8 The simulations have also been carried out with durations of 10 and 20 years.  
We use a discount rate of 3 percent, close to the real interest rate on Dutch government debt. This 
discount rate is also used in pension studies by the European Union (Economic Policy Committee, 
2006). In a second simulation we use a higher discount rate of 5 percent. Also, we have set the 
rate of return on pension capital equal to the discount rate. This methodology avoids that risk 
premiums are treated in an asymmetric manner and is in line with current international 
conventions (cf. Van Ewijk et al., 2006). 
We assume for the sake of simplicity that the accumulated capital will be paid out from the age of 
65. The average age of death is 77, so the average number of years during which the pension 
capital is paid out as benefits is assumed to be 12.  
In order to estimate the relevant tax rates, we used Income Panel Data from Statistics Netherlands 
(2006) which contain extensive information on the distribution of taxable income across income 
groups. This makes it possible to classify taxpayers by tax brackets. Pensioners of 65 years and 
older have 70 percent of their income in the first or second tax bracket, 20 percent in the third tax 
bracket and the remainder in the highest tax bracket. This gives a weighted seniors tax rate (τb) of 
about 25.5 percent on supplementary pension. Next, we estimated the tax rate to be applied to the 
pension contributions (τc), which are tax-deducted under the EET-rule and paid out of after tax 
income in the benchmark case. We find a weighted effective tax rate for the year 2000 of 44 
percent.9 During the accumulation period the annual return will be taxed at the same rate under 
the benchmark rule, so τc = τg = 44 percent. 
 
Results 
We calculate the present value of taxes paid and of pension capital (pension expenditure) under 
the Dutch tax rule and under the benchmark rule. No account is taken of the possible behavioral 
effects of implementing the benchmark rule. The difference between the tax yield when using the 
benchmark rule and when using the Dutch tax rule is called the ‘fiscal subsidy’ associated with the 
Dutch tax rule. Table 2 shows the results of a number of simulations, including a sensitivity 
analysis. 
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8  This estimation is confirmed by CPB Netherlands Bureau of Economic Policy Analysis (not published). The 
relative low duration (below half of the maximum time period people could build up their pension) can partly 
be explained by the high relative weight of pension contributions of older workers with on average high 
incomes.  
9  Account has been taken in these calculations of the so-called threshold effect: tax payers may go into a 
lower tax bracket because of the use of the tax deduction. On this see Caminada & Goudswaard (1996). 
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Table 2 Effects of different tax treatments of pension saving  x billion euros in NPV 
 
  
Rate of return 5% 
(discount rate 5%) 
 
Rate of return 3% 
(discount rate 3%) 
       
 benchmark Dutch difference benchmark Dutch difference 
 tax rule tax rule  tax rule tax rule  
 TTE (1) EET (2) (1)-(2) TTE (1) EET (2) (1)-(2) 
       
Period of pension capital growth:  
20 years 
       
Tax revenue 11.7 3.8   10.0 3.8   
Fiscal subsidy current tax rule    +7.9    +6.2 
(-) partial effect low senior tax rate    +2.8    +2.8 
(-) partial effect deferral tax payment    +5.1    +3.4 
           
Accumulated capital (pension 
expenditure) 9.8 14.9 -5.1 11.5 14.9 -3.4 
       
Period of pension capital growth:  
15 years 
       
Tax revenue 10.6 3.8   9.2 3.8   
Fiscal subsidy current tax rule    +6.8    +5.4 
(-) partial effect low senior tax rate    +2.8    +2.8 
(-) partial effect deferral tax payment    +4.0    +2.6 
           
Accumulated capital (pension 
expenditure) 10.8 14.9 -4.1 12.3 14.9 -2.6 
       
Period of pension capital growth:  
10 years 
       
Tax revenue 9.4 3.8   8.4 3.8   
Fiscal subsidy current tax rule    +5.6    +4.6 
(-) partial effect low senior tax rate    +2.8    +2.8 
(-) partial effect deferral tax payment    +2.8    +1.8 
           
Accumulated capital (pension 
expenditure) 12.1 14.9 -2.8 13.1 14.9 -1.8 
 
Explanatory note: 
C0=14.9 billion euro; τc=44.0 percent, τg=44.0 percent; τb=25.5 percent; n=10, 15, or 20 years; r=3 or 5 
percent, and δ = 3 respectively 5 percent. All amounts are x billion euros. Euros in net present value (NPV) so 
that the amounts relating to the various different years have been made comparable; a discount rate of 3 
percent has been used. 
 
Source: own calculations; all data and simulation results are available upon request. 
 
Investment return and discount rate 
At an annual rate of return on the pension capital of 3 percent and a discount rate of 3 percent the 
tax actually paid - in terms of net present value and measured over a period of 15 years - is 3.8 
billion euros, compared to 9.2 euros in the benchmark case. The actual tax paid therefore amounts 
to only 41 percent of what would be owed if the benchmark rule were to be applied. In other 
words, application of the Dutch tax rule for pensions gives a fiscal subsidy of 5.4 billion euros. At a 
higher rate of return on investment (5 percent) the fiscal subsidy increases to 6.8 billion euros.  
We performed our simulations with several other discount rates. It appears that the result is not 
very sensitive to the discount rate used. The fiscal subsidy reported in Table 2 increases by 0.5 to 
0.9 billion euros per point higher discount rate, depending on the length of the build-up period. 
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Duration 
We also simulated durations of capital build-up of 10 and 20 years. Measured over a ten year 
period, the Dutch tax rule 'only' gives a subsidy of 4.6 billion euros (in terms of net present value, 
at a rate of return of 3 percent). A doubling of the duration from 10 to 20 years generates a 
substantially higher subsidy of 6.2 billion euros due to the additional capital growth. This capital 
growth remains untaxed during the build-up period of the pension capital under the EET-regime. In 
addition, the higher annual pension benefit payments arising from this will only be taxed at a 
relatively low seniors rate. In other words, the fiscal subsidy on pension savings increases when 
pension schemes have a longer duration before they start to pay out pension benefits. 
 
Partial effects  
The relatively low tax rate for seniors and the deferral of tax payment together generate the fiscal 
advantage associated with the Dutch tax rule. In the case of a 5 percent rate of return and a period 
of pension capital growth of 10 years, the partial effect of the deferral of tax payment is about 
equal to the effect of the lower senior rate. The share of the deferral of tax payment in the total 
fiscal subsidy increases when pension schemes have a longer duration before they start to pay out 
pension benefits. 
 
Pension capital 
The simulations show that the present value of accumulated pension capital (and thus of pension 
expenditure) is higher under the Dutch tax code than under the benchmark tax code.10 The 
difference is larger at a longer build-up period and a higher investment return. This result, of 
course, depends on our assumption of constant contributions in the two regimes. Nevertheless, it 
can be concluded that the Dutch tax code favors the build-up of pension capital, and therefore the 
level of pension benefits.  
 
 
Time-series analysis  
 
Fiscal subsidy 1990-2000  
The calculations for the year 2000 show that the Dutch tax rule implies a revenue loss to the 
Treasury compared to the benchmark. Structurally, the fiscal subsidy on pension savings at a rate 
of return on the pension capital of 3 percent and a duration of 15 years comes to about 5.4 billion 
euros (1.34 percent GDP) in net present value terms.11 
Figure 1 shows the estimates for all the years in the period 1990-2000 calculated in the same way as 
explained above for the year 2000.12 The fiscal subsidy rises during this period by 38 percent due to 
higher pension contributions. In the case of a 3 percent yield, the fiscal subsidy rises from 0.97 to 
1.34 percent of GDP; if a yield of 5 percent is used, the fiscal subsidy rises from 1.22 percent in 1990 
to 1.69 percent of GDP in 2000. 
 
Estimates fiscal subsidy for 2001 - 2003 
The analysis so far refers to the situation for the year 2000. Under the new Income Tax Act 2001 
accumulation of capital – if the benchmark rule would be applied – should be taxed at a lower rate 
                                                 
10 Note that the amount of pension capital as build-up in N years will always be less under the benchmark tax 
rule where a tax rate is levied on the proceeds of the investments (τg>0). 
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11 Yoo & de Serres (2004) also estimated the net tax cost of pension savings in the Netherlands, using the 
present-value approach. They find that overall cost arising from contributions made in 2000, are almost 1.2 
percent of GDP (p. 94), which result is very similar to ours.  
12  The amount of fiscal subsidy we find for recent years is lower than in previous work (Caminada and 
Goudswaard, 2004) due to several more realistic assumptions made and due to improved data. 
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than was the case in the year 2000. Also, the other relevant tax rates have been reduced. A special 
feature in the new legislation is a 30 percent tax to be levied on income from net assets, based on 
the assumption that a taxable rate of return of 4 percent is made on net assets, irrespective of the 
actual returns. Thus, under the benchmark rule a 1.2 percent tax should be levied on the 
accumulated pension savings, irrespective of the actual returns. Additional returns above 4 percent 
are not taxed.  
Figure 1 shows the estimates of the fiscal subsidy for the period 2001-2003 under the new tax 
regime. The (one-time) effect of lower rates under the Income Tax 2001 diminished the fiscal 
subsidy on pension savings, but this is counterbalanced by the effect of the sharp increase of the 
contribution input for pensions in recent years.13 In the year 2003, the fiscal subsidy on pension 
savings under the current Dutch tax rule amounts to 7.0 billion euros (1.49 percent GDP). At an 
annual investment return rate of 5 percent, the subsidy declines to 6.8 billion euros (1.45 percent of 
GDP). Note that due to the tax reform annual rates of return on net assets above 4 percent are not 
taxed if the benchmark is applied; this explains the remarkable drop of the fiscal subsidy in the 
year 2001, in case a rate of return of 5 percent is simulated. See Figure 1. 
 
Figure 1 Fiscal subsidy associated with Dutch tax rule as percentage of GDP, 1990-2003 
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Source: own calculations (build-up period 15 years) 
 
The no-fiscal subsidy case 
We have calculated the tax rate on pension benefits under the Dutch tax rule (τb*) that would 
generate exactly the same amount of tax revenue as under the benchmark rule. When this tax rate 
would be applied, the fiscal subsidy on pension saving would disappear. Table 3 shows the 
simulation results both before and after the tax reform 2001. 
The equivalent pension benefit tax rate is significantly higher than the actual rate (see equation 9; 
τb= 25.5 percent). The new Income Tax Act 2001 reduced the fiscal subsidy on pension savings, 
and has therefore also reduced the equivalent tax rate on pension benefits. In our simulations we 
find a drop in the equivalent tax rate on pension benefits varying from 4 to 17 percentage points, 
mainly depending on the investment yield used. 
 
                                                 
13  The pension investment rose from 3.7 percent of GDP in 2000 to an estimated 4.7 percent in 2003. 
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Table 3 Equivalent tax rate on pension benefits 
 
  
Rate of return 5% 
(discount rate 5%) 
 
Rate of return 3% 
(discount rate 3%) 
         
 benchmark  
tax rate 
TTE 
 
    τc                  τg       
actual  
tax rate 
EET 
 
τb 
equivalent 
tax rate 
EET 
 
τb* 
benchmark  
tax rate 
TTE 
 
 τc                    τg      
actual  
tax rate 
EET 
 
τ b 
equivalent 
tax rate 
EET 
 
τ b* 
         
panel (a): year 2000         
Duration 20 years: tax rates 44.0 44.0 25.5 78.5 44.0 44.0 25.5 66.7 
Duration 15 years: tax rates 44.0 44.0 25.5 71.2 44.0 44.0 25.5 61.6 
Duration 10 years: tax rates 44.0 44.0 25.5 63.1 44.0 44.0 25.5 56.1 
             
panel (b): year 2001             
Duration 20 years: tax rates 41.1 30.0 25.5 61.1 41.1 30.0 25.5 62.6 
Duration 15 years: tax rates 41.1 30.0 25.5 56.7 41.1 30.0 25.5 57.5 
Duration 10 years: tax rates 41.1 30.0 25.5 51.9 41.1 30.0 25.5 52.3 
 
Source: own calculations 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
Several OECD countries use tax incentives to encourage private pension savings. These incentives 
may imply lower tax revenue for the Treasury. This paper investigates the ex ante revenue effects of 
a cash-flow tax regime for pension savings by full present-value calculations. We used a specified 
form of a comprehensive income tax system (TTE) as a benchmark. Compared to the comprehensive 
income tax, the cash-flow tax regime implies lower tax revenue, because tax payments are deferred 
and returns on accumulated funds are exempted, and because withdrawals are generally subject to 
lower marginal tax rates than pension contributions. With our model the ex ante revenue effect of the 
current tax treatment of pension saving in countries can be quantified.  
We performed an empirical analysis for the Netherlands as a typical example of a country with 
significant tax-favored private retirement saving schemes. Our simulations, using Income Panel 
Data, show that the Dutch tax rule – i.e. taxation on a cash-flow basis - means on balance lower 
revenue for the Treasury, compared to a specific form of a comprehensive income tax. At a real 
rate of return on the pension capital of 3 percent and a build-up period of 15 years, the fiscal 
subsidy in terms of net present value comes to 1.3 percent of the GDP for the year 2000. At a rate 
of return of 5 percent, the fiscal subsidy on pension saving rises to 1.7 percent of GDP.  
The new Income Tax Act 2001 reduced the amount of the fiscal subsidy on pension saving due to 
the lower relevant tax rates, but the amount of contributions has risen sharply since the year 2000. 
For the year 2003, we estimate a fiscal subsidy of 1.4 to 1.5 percent of GDP. To present this result 
in another way: when the current tax rule is maintained, the tax rates on pension benefits should 
roughly be doubled to fade away the current fiscal subsidy on pension savings in the Netherlands. 
The ‘loss’ of tax revenue due to the favorable tax treatment of pension plans in the Netherlands will 
probably increase in the near future, because of increasing pension contributions. The tax subsidy 
on pensions is one of the largest ‘tax expenditures’ which therefore should be justified. This does 
not necessarily imply that this tax expenditure should be abolished. Our model and material 
presented are tentative and do not give any answer on the question whether society would be 
better off in case alternative tax codes on pension saving would be applied. This would require both 
a comprehensive economic analysis as social efficiency considerations which are beyond the scope 
of this paper. 
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